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This paper reviews the macroeconomic use of national fiscal policy in EMU and examines the 
rational and scope for a collective insurance system which redistributes income among 
countries in response to asymmetric cyclical shocks. The analysis of the record of national 
fiscal policies before and after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty finds evidence that the 
quality of fiscal policies has improved in two ways: they are more clearly countercyclical – or 
less procyclical – and they are more readily used to restore competitiveness than to attempt to 
boost demand when competitiveness is eroded. These observations suggest that fiscal policy 
remains a useful instrument. One question is whether it can be augmented – or perhaps 
substituted for – with a collective insurance system. Collective insurance is one alternative to 
external borrowing and lending and therefore one way to deal with the concerns that the SGP 
is meant to address. We examine in more detail two collective insurance systems: tax revenue 
sharing and unemployment insurance sharing. We find that the earlier is more promising and 
examine in some detail how it could be set up. It is no panacea, though. Any insurance 
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1.  Introduction 
Ten years after the adoption of the single currency, the status of national fiscal policies 
remains an unresolved and controversial issue. On the one hand, fiscal policy is not a shared 
competence. On the other hand, the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) rests on the principle 
that national budget outcomes are an area of common interest. As implemented by the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), it envisages situations where a national government is 
requested to make explicit quantitative commitments, which can be specified by the Council, 
following recommendations from the Commission. More broadly, within the Stability 
programs, each Eurozone country must present each year its intended budget balance to be 
reached over the following three years, with the explicit aim of achieving budgets close to 
balance or in surplus. These programs must gain Council approval when they are presented 
and cannot be subsequently changed unless specific conditions are deemed acceptable. A 
country found in violation of its commitments is bound to face increasingly tight requests, 
with the possibility of being imposed a fine.  
 
Thus, national fiscal policies belong to a grey zone of potentially constrained sovereignty. 
Governments remain fully sovereign in setting the level and detailed composition of their 
spending and revenues
1 and they can run smaller deficits or larger surpluses than they 
committed themselves to. The SGP only deals with the balance and is geared towards limiting 
deficits, both absolutely by setting a maximum deficit of 3% of GDP and by aiming at 
budgets close to balance or in surplus, and relatively by banning larger deficits or smaller 
surpluses than those initially approved.  
 
This grey zone aspect raises important constitutional issues, as was amply illustrated by the 
November 2003 Council decision to put the SGP “in abeyance” and by the subsequent 
deliberation of the European Court of Justice. The new SGP, adopted in June 2005, has not 
addressed this particular issue, which, consequently, remains open. The revision instead 
introduced some implementation flexibility, with the aim of preventing economically 
inefficient consequences.  
 
This paper starts with the macroeconomics of fiscal policy to evaluate various institutional 
arrangements. It argues that limits to budget balance sovereignty need to be carefully 
justified. The usual argument in favor of the EDP and the SGP is that fiscal indiscipline by 
one or more Eurozone members constitutes a negative externality that threatens price 
stability. The basis of this argument can be found in the theory of fiscal dominance, which is 
reviewed in Section 2. Whether this argument is strong enough to justify the EDP remains an 
unresolved issue. At any rate, even if it is justified, there remains the need to examine how it 
can be implemented without excessive economic costs. 
 
To that effect, we evaluate the idea that, to be sustainable, restraints to the countercyclical use 
of national fiscal policy must be compensated for by an adequate collective insurance system. 
This idea has a long legacy. The desirability of a collective insurance system in a European 
Monetary Union was mentioned early on in MacDougall Report (European Commission 
1977a, b) and the Delors Report (Delors, 1989) and presented as an extension of the Optimum 
Currency Area theory (see, e.g. Wyplosz, 1991). It has given rise to a significant literature, 
both theoretical (van Wincoop, 1995; Sorensen and Yosha, 1997; Persson and Tabellini, 
1996b; Fatas, 1998; Kletzer and von Hagen, 2001) and empirical (Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, 
1991; von Hagen, 1992; Pisani-Ferry, Italianer and Lescure, 1993; Bayoumi and Masson, 
1995; von Hagen and Hammond, 1998; Melitz and Zumer, 1999).  
 
                                                      
1 There exist some limits on the size of taxes like VAT.  2 
 
 
Even if one were to conclude that some collective insurance system is indeed desirable, there 
remains the question of how to design such an arrangement. In Section 4, we examine a 
number of proposals that have surfaced.  
 
 
2.  The Fiscal Dominance Case for the SGP 
There are a number of justifications for the SGP. Two of them are unconvincing. It is argued 
that that one country’s deficit stands to raise the euro area interest rate and thus impose a cost 
externality on all other countries. This view seems rooted in an IS-LM view of the world. 
Even then, since Europe is financially integrated in world markets, its interest rate is 
essentially exogenous, especially as each member country is “small”. A more elaborate 
version allows for interest rate parity and argues that a deficit raises the interest rate through 
expected depreciation. The theory behind this assertion is at best weak and, importantly, there 
is no evidence linking budget balances to the exchange and interest rates. The only evidence 
is that investors discriminate among borrowers, which means that there is no externality.
2  
 
Another argument in favor of the SGP is that it is a form of coordination among national 
fiscal authorities. Here again, the need for coordination must rest on some substantial 
externality that is demonstrated. Moreover, even if such an externality were to exist, it would 
remain to establish that the SGP-induced coordination is optimal. There is no theoretical or 
empirical evidence that this is the case.
3  
 
The fundamental argument in favor of the SGP is that fiscal indiscipline can become the 
source of inflation. It is based on solid empirical evidence. Indeed, it is well known since (at 
least) the hyperinflation episodes of the 1920s that fiscal indiscipline can lead to inflation. 
The theoretical interpretation has been elaborated by Sargent and Wallace (1981), Canzoneri 
et al. (2001) and Woodford (2001) among others. It can be briefly summarized with the 
government budget constraint:  
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where St is the primary budget surplus in period t, it the interest rate and Bt and Mt are the 
beginning of period stocks of public debt and base money, all expressed in nominal terms. 
Dividing by the nominal GDP PtYt and denoting the total public sector debt as Dt = Bt + Mt, 
(1) can be rewritten as:  
 
























































ρ  is the growth-adjusted real interest rate factor. Public sector 
solvency requires that the transversality condition 
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= ∞ → ρ  be satisfied. When 
this is the case, iterating (2) forward, we get:  
 
                                                       
2 For empirical evidence showing that investors indeed discriminate among public borrowers in the 
euro area see Bernoth et al (2004). 
3 Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2006) conclude that the pact is far from optimal.  3 
 
 








































is the budget surplus inclusive of seigniorage as a ratio to 
GDP.  
The solvency condition can be satisfied in many ways. First, budget discipline may ensure 
that future budget surpluses St+i are such that they match the actual public sector debt. Second, 
fiscal discipline can be weak and recourse to seigniorage is needed to deliver the needed 
sequence of {st+i}. This is the channel through which, historically, fiscal indiscipline has 
repeatedly delivered inflationary episodes. This is why the Maastricht Treaty explicitly rules 
out any financing of budgets through seigniorage, both on a routine basis and in an 
emergency situation, the latter case being dealt with through the no-bailout clause. This is 
also why the independence of the ECB is guaranteed by the treaty.  
 
The third case is the relevant one. If the sequence of {st+i} violates the solvency condition, it 
is the price level Pt on the left-hand side of (3) that becomes the variable of adjustment. This 
is the case of fiscal dominance where the budgetary authorities can impose their will and 
carry out unsustainable budget deficits. Monetary dominance is the opposite case, when 
neither seigniorage nor the price level are made to be endogenous in (3) so that the variable of 
adjustment is the disciplined sequence of {st+i}. The task of the SGP can be seen as imposing 
fiscal dominance so that control of the price level is not lost and without having to call upon 
seigniorage as mandated by the treaty.  
 
 
3.  What Do National Governments Do with their Fiscal Policies? 
3.1.  Policy effects 
Unsurprisingly, the question of the usefulness of fiscal policy as a macroeconomic tool is 
highly controversial. At the theoretical level, the debate pits (neo)Classical against 
(neo)Keynesian macroeconomists. The former asserts that, one way or another, consumers 
and firms view public debts as their own liability; accordingly, they reduce their expenditures 
whenever the debt increases or diminishes less than previously expected. The latter relies on 
price stickiness, borrowing constraints and/or other market imperfections to find that fiscal 
policy can affect output.
4 In view of such conflicting theoretical results, the verdict should 
come from empirical studies.   
 
Empirically, too, the issue is controversial. Some authors find that fiscal policy affects output, 
even though the multipliers are small and have possibly declined in recent years (Blanchard 
and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2004, 2007; Favero and Giavazzi, 2007; Romer and Romer, 2007). 
Others find that consumption moves in an offsetting direction, although the offset effect is 
partial, which leaves a small output effect (Ramey, 2006).  
 
Why do different authors reach different results? All the above papers use VAR estimates to 
pinpoint the relationship between output and fiscal policy. All of them also use the cyclically-
adjusted balance as a measure of the fiscal policy stance.
5 They differ in the way they identify 
the VARs. Those who find a positive effect of fiscal shocks on consumption, and therefore 
output, typically use quarterly variables and make the assumption that there is no 
contemporaneous effect from cyclical conditions to policy discretionary actions. 
                                                       
4 For a brief review of the arguments, see Ramey (2006) and Perotti (2004).  
5 A different literature looks at the automatic stabilizers. Buti et al. (2003) claim that a heavy tax 
burden may well reduce the effectiveness of the stabilizers.  4 
 
 
Working with US data, Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) and Burnside, Eichenbaum 
and Fisher (2004), Ramey (2006) and Romer and Romer (2007) adopt the event study 
approach and identify discretionary actions by studying contemporaneous press reports, 
focusing on war-related military spending or on tax changes not related to cyclical conditions.  
 
The first approach suffers from two main limitations; first the use of quarterly data sits 
uncomfortably with the typical annual frequency of budgetary exercises; second, discrete 
fiscal policy actions are usually prepared over a significant period of time, which opens up the 
possibility that output responds to expectations of fiscal shocks, not just to the shocks 
themselves.  The second approach suffers from some arbitrariness in identifying the relevant 
policy episodes, which are large by nature, possibly overlooking other, smaller episodes, 
which may have different effects.  
 
These controversies are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. We note that there is no 
empirical evidence in favor of the assumption that fiscal policy has no effect. The debate is 
about the consumption impact of fiscal policies and on the size of the overall output effect, 
which is mostly found to be in the Keynesian direction.
 6 Skeptics may argue that fiscal policy 
is not very powerful, but they do not claim that it is wholly impotent.  
3.2.  Policy motivation: the euro effect 
That fiscal policy can be used as a macroeconomic policy tool does not mean that 
governments do so in an appropriate way. A long tradition has identified a number of lags – 
recognition, decision, implementation – which could result in badly timed effects. An equally 
long tradition has pointed out that governments may be more motivated by political gains 
rather than by economic management concerns. If fiscal policy actions are not driven by a 
macroeconomic stabilization motive, it may not be systematically countercyclical.  
 
The question, then, is whether euro area membership affect policymakers’ incentives and, if 
so, how. A first place to look at is the SGP. On one hand, it can help governments to resist 
pressure from interest groups and therefore improve the quality of fiscal policy. On the other 
hand, it reduces the room for maneuver and lead to pro-cyclical policies.  
 
Another consideration is the fact that the exchange rate is no longer available to boost 
external competitiveness, with two opposite potential effects on the conduct of fiscal policy. 
First, governments may be tempted to use fiscal policy instead of monetary policy to 
counteract a temporary competitiveness loss when a euro appreciation reduces domestic 
demand. A different case concerns a loss of external competitiveness due to domestic 
inflation or to a relative productivity decline. In a monetary union, external competitiveness 
can only be restored the hard way, through sustained cost and price moderation or enhanced 
productivity gains. Fiscal policy is no longer a substitute to monetary policy.
7 Its only 
possible macroeconomic contribution is to encourage cost and price moderation, possibly by 
restricting demand in goods and labor markets. This would make fiscal policy countercyclical 
during upswings and acyclical during downswings as long as the exchange rate is overvalued. 
A case in point is Germany over 2000-6.   
 
All in all, the impact of the adoption of the euro on the macroeconomic use of fiscal policy is 
ambiguous. We expect more countercyclical action as fiscal policy substitutes for the lost 
monetary policy instrument, less use of this instrument in downswings as a result of the SGP, 
                                                       
6 Yet another empirical literature examines the possibility of non-Keynesian effects, whereby a fiscal 
expansion (contraction) has contractionary (expansionary) effects. We ignore this small literature as it 
seems to concern exceptional events, see Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Giavazzi et al. (2000).  
7 Tax changes, as enacted in Germany in 2007, may partly mimic a depreciation, but this is not a 
macroeconomic use and it does not require any change in the budget balance.  5 
 
 
especially in countries where the budget deficit is not far enough from its 3% ceiling and an 
asymmetric use for countries with an external competitiveness shortfall.  
 
3.3.  The evidence 
Some of these presumptions have been tested. Looking at Eurozone countries, Gali and 
Perotti (2003), Fatas and Mihov (2001, 2003), and Wyplosz (2005) have found that, in most 
cases fiscal policy has been acyclical, sometimes even procyclical. They also report that the 
constraints imposed by the monetary union, the convergence criteria of the “Maastricht years” 
1992-98 and the SGP since 1999, have led to somewhat less policy activism and, as a 
consequence, to less procyclical policies. Fatas and Mihov (2001, 2003) further document that 
the SGP constraints seem to have mitigated the various influences that are believed to distort 
the use of the fiscal policy instrument.  
 
These estimates are based on the early experience of monetary union. We revisit them with 
data that extend to 2006, see the data appendix. We adopt the formulation proposed by Gali 
and Perotti (2003):  
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where dt is the annual budget deficit, Et-1yt is the expected output gap and bt is the public debt 
(dt and bt are expressed as percent of GDP). The coefficients 
b β and 
a β correspond to the 
period before and after 1992 onward; the break is introduced to test whether the restrictions 
adopted in the Maastricht treaty have affected the cyclical use of fiscal policy. An alternative 
is to break the sample in 1999, or even to consider three subperiods, separating out the 
Maastricht from the monetary union years, but the data support the break as indicated. The 
expected output gap is estimated as in Gali and Perotti (2003) by replacing Et-1yt with yt and 
instrumenting it with the US and Japanese output gaps and the lagged output gap yt-1. A 
countercyclical use of fiscal policy implies that  0 <
b β  and  0 <
a β .The assumption that the 
adoption of the common currency has fostered a substitution of fiscal for monetary policy as 
the macroeconomic stabilization tool implies that 
a b β β > .  
 
We also use this framework to test the other hypotheses presented above. To test whether the 
SGP has an asymmetric effect over the cycle, limiting the countercyclical use of fiscal policy 
in downswings, we replace  t t




− + t t
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t t
a y E y E 1 1 β β  where 
−
t y  is the output 
gap when it is negative and zero when it is positive. The hypothesis implies that  0 >
− a β .  
 
We have also noted that fiscal policy could be used as a substitute for lost monetary policy 
when dealing with external competitiveness. One hypothesis is that, independently of the 
cyclical position already captured with Et-1yt, fiscal policy is expansionary when external 
competitiveness is declining. Another hypothesis is that fiscal policy is instead used to reduce 
costs and regain competitiveness by being restrictive. We can test which hypothesis is borne 
out by adding:  
X X
a b θ θ +  
where X is a measure of external competitiveness and 
b θ  and 
a θ  correspond to before and 
after 1992. When fiscal policy is used to compress costs when competitiveness is low, we 
expect to find  0 >
i θ . If instead fiscal policy is used to offset the demand effects of poor 
competitiveness, we should have  0 <
i θ . If the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of Euro 
area have reinforced the use of fiscal policy as a countercyclical tool, we should find 
0 ≤ <
b a θ θ . If instead fiscal policy was initially used as a demand management tool before 6 
 
 
the Maastricht Treaty and then was put in charge of restoring competitiveness because 
exchange rate realignments are no longer possible, we expect to find  0 <
b θ  and  0 >
a θ .  
 
Another hypothesis, mentioned above, is that the use of fiscal policy in the face of a 
deterioration of competitiveness depends on the cyclical position of the economy. For 
instance, it could be procyclical during upswings and acyclical or countercyclical during 
















b y E y E y E y E 1 1 1 1 λ λ λ λ  
where
+ b λ and
− b λ refer to periods before 1992 when external competitiveness is week and 
when, respectively, the output gap is positive and negative, with a similar definition for 
+ a λ and
− a λ the coefficients corresponding to the post-1992 period. Including these terms 
generally deteriorates all the estimates, and yields non-significant values for these terms. This 
remains the case if we eliminate the pre-Maastricht years – i.e. we impose  0 = =
− + b b λ λ  – 
with 0 >
+ a λ , and 0 <
− a λ  but still not significant.  
 
In the end, therefore, we estimate:  
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To measure competitiveness, we use the real exchange rate, defined as relative unit labor 
costs, constructed such that an increase represents in external competitiveness. Since some 
real exchange rates are trended, we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a high degree of 
smoothing to preserve low frequency fluctuations.
8 We instrument Xt with its lag and the real 
exchange rates of Japan and US and their own lags. 
 
Table 1 presents our results.
9 The deficit dt is cyclically-adjusted and net of interest payments 
on the debt. We present first country by country estimates and then the results from pooling 
all Euro Area countries together. The country by country estimates suffer from the short 
sample; the longest time series are only available for 1971-2006, and much less so some 
countries. The pooled estimates assume that the coefficients are the same for all countries, 
which may not to be the case, but they rely on a larger sample (the panel is unbalanced with a 
total of 270 observations).  
Table 1. The budget deficit reaction function 
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain Pooled 1 Pooled 2
0.15 0.08 0.47 0.25 -0.24 0.12 0.55 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.01
0.56 0.67 0.27 0.24 0.55 0.62 0.23 0.80 0.68 0.43 0.92
0.80 1.28 -1.37 0.19 0.71 -0.07 1.05 -0.25 -0.03 -1.14 -1.17
0.26 0.66 0.42 0.76 0.57 0.90 0.09 0.72 0.95 0.07 0.06
-1.32 -0.63 0.78 0.11 -1.05 0.26 -0.79 1.36 0.45 1.50 0.57
0.22 0.82 0.77 0.90 0.64 0.68 0.48 0.23 0.57 0.12 0.28
-0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.07 -0.19 -0.11 0.02 -0.10 -0.13 -0.14 -0.03
0.05 0.89 0.79 0.26 0.11 0.02 0.88 0.28 0.15 0.04 0.17
-0.11 -0.51 0.21 0.01 0.11 0.05 -0.12 0.01 0.23 0.25 0.28
0.19 0.41 0.49 0.91 0.35 0.33 0.04 0.95 0.09 0.03 0.09
-0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.10 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02
0.01 0.06 0.41 0.63 0.50 0.16 0.00 0.84 0.39 0.46 0.00
0.12 0.73 -0.08 0.71 0.59 0.51 0.30 0.44 1.04 0.79 0.73
0.60 0.00 0.83 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample period 1977-2006 1971-2006 1976-2006 1979-2006 1971-2006 1986-2006 1981-2006 1971-2006 1981-2006 1971-2006 1971-2006
t t
b y E 1 − β
t t
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Source: see Appendix 
                                                       
8 We set the smoothing parameter to 1000.  
9 Due to missing data, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal are not included in the sample.  7 
 
 
Notes: p-statistic reported under coefficients; White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Instruments: yt-1 and Xt-1, and yt, yt-1, Xt and Xt-1 for the US and Japan, The constant and country fixed-
effects not reported. In the case of Italy, the set of available information for 
+
− t t
b y E 1 λ and 
+
− t t
a y E 1 λ is 
too small so we do not distinguish between pre and post 1992 – i.e. we impose 




The country-by-country estimates are often imprecise, which partly reflects the short size of 
the sample. We focus our discussion on the panel estimates, as shown in the columns labeled 
“Pooled 1”. Table 2 summarizes the test results. These results confirm previous findings that 
fiscal policy has become counter-cyclical since 1992. Yet, the finding that  0 >
− a β  indicates 
that this shift occurred during upswings while fiscal policy remains approximately acyclical 
during downswings. In other words, the SGP is having asymmetrical effects. These results 
differ from those reported in the EU Commission (2006) which finds that prior to 1992 fiscal 
policy was procyclical in bad times and acyclical otherwise, while it has become procyclical 
in good times after the adoption of the euro. To check whether our results, the column 
“Pooled 2” shows the results when we break the sample in 1999, so that “before” refers to the 
period 1970-1998 and “after” to the period 1999-2006. The results remain practically 
unchanged.
10   
 
Table 2. Tests 
 
Fiscal policy counter-cyclical until 1991 
 
0 <
b β   No, acyclical 
Fiscal policy counter-cyclical after 1992 
 
0 <
a β   Yes 
Fiscal policy more counter-cyclical in Maastricht years 
 
b a β β <   Yes 
SGP limits counter-cyclical policy in downswings 
 
0 >
− a β   Yes 
Fiscal policy acts on demand to compensate for external 
competitiveness difficulties until 1991 
0 <
b θ   Yes 
Fiscal policy acts on demand to compensate for external 
competitiveness difficulties after 1992 
0 <
a θ   No 
Fiscal policy acts on costs to deal with external 
competitiveness until 1991 
0 >
b θ   No 
Fiscal policy acts on costs to deal with external 
competitiveness after 1992 
0 >
a θ   Yes 
 
 
Regarding the use of fiscal policy to deal with external competitiveness, we find that the 
situation has been radically altered following the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. Up until 
1991, our results suggest that governments used fiscal policy to make up for demand shortfall 
when they faced external competitiveness losses, and conversely tightened up fiscal policy 
when external competitiveness was boosting demand. After 1992, instead, they tightened up 
fiscal policy in the face of deteriorating competitiveness as if they were using their last 
remaining macroeconomic instrument to weigh on costs. These results suggest that 
governments are now willing to suffer short-term demand shortfalls to restore cost 
competitiveness. Put differently, fiscal policy is not necessarily misused.  
                                                       
10 They are also unchanged if we compare the periods 1970-1991 and 1999-2006, dropping the 
Maastricht years 1992-98. A possible explanation is that the Commission’s results are based on a 
graphical analysis. Another possibility is that they look at the realtionship between changes in the 




The recent literature has emphasized the importance of budgeting institutions, i.e., the rules 
and norms under which governments plan their budgets, pass them through the legislature and 
implement them, for achieving fiscal discipline. Empirical research in this area, documented 
and summarized in Hallerberg et al. (2007), supports the view that good budgeting institutions 
are a precondition for achieving the fiscal discipline desired for EMU. It is, therefore, 
interesting to see whether budgeting institutions which are strongly conducive to fiscal 
discipline prevent governments from using fiscal policy effectively for macro economic 
stabilization. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) find that governments following the 
“delegation approach” to budgeting institutions conduct more effective stabilization policies 
than others.
11 In this view the Stability and Growth Pact can operate as a substitute for week 
budgetary institutions.  
 
In order to test whether different qualities of institutions have indeed affected the budget 
outcomes, we use four indicators developed by Hallerberg et al. (2007): 
- Good budgeting institutions under either approach make fiscal policy more countercyclical; 
- Good budgeting institutions under the contracts approach make fiscal policy more 
countercyclical; 
- Good budgeting institutions under the delegation approach make fiscal policy more 
countercyclical; 
- Stringent fiscal rules make fiscal policy more countercyclical.  
We successively augment the panel regression shown in Table 1 with each of four dummy 
variables coded 1 for the country and period when the corresponding property is found to 
apply, and 0 otherwise.  
 
The resulting regressions, not shown, fail to detect any significant effect. This may due to the 
small size of the sample – data availability limits the sample to only nine euro area member 
countries. Alternatively, it may be that these institutional differences have not affected the 
governments’ ability to conduct countercyclical policies. This would indicate that there is, 
from an institutional design perspective, no trade-off between fiscal discipline and effective 
macro economic stabilization.  
 
4.  Mutual Insurance via Transfers 
4.1.  Principles of Fiscal Insurance 
All existing  federations provide mechanisms to redistribute income among their constituent 
regions in response to economic developments that affect the latter in different ways 
((Ingram, 1959). These mechanisms can be explicit, as in the case of Germany’s 
“Finanzausgleich,” or the Canadian and Australian systems of fiscal equalization, or implicit, 
as in the case of the US, where redistribution works through the federal government budget. 
They can be organized horizontally, as in Germany and Canada, where state governments pay 
and receive transfers to and from other state governments, or vertically, as in Australia, where 
the federal government pays transfers to the individual territories in accordance with their 
fiscal needs. They can be transfers between governments or the result of transfers to and from 
private households through a nation-wide social insurance system such as unemployment 
insurance. Such mechanisms are generally based on equity considerations: The aim of 
protecting the individual against economic hardship is part of the solidarity defining a society.  
As Delors (1989, p. 89) put it in his plea for a risk-sharing mechanism among the members of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU), “... in all federations the different combinations of 
federal budgetary mechanisms have powerful “shock-absorber” effects dampening the 
                                                       
11 Under the delegation approach, budgeting institutions lend significant agenda setting powers to the 
finance minister. In contrast, the “contracts approach” builds on binding numerical targets negotiated 
among all actors in the budget process at the beginning of the process. See Hallerberg et al (2007).  9 
 
 
amplitude either of economic difficulties or of surges in prosperity of individual states. This is 
both the product of, and the source of the sense of national solidarity which all relevant 
economic and monetary unions share.”  
 
  Although they were not designed explicitly for that purpose, transfer mechanisms of 
this kind can be regarded as an insurance mechanism against asymmetric cyclical 
fluctuations. Regions in a more favorable cyclical position than the federation on average pay 
transfers to regions in a less favorable position. This dampens the relative boom in the former 
and the relative recession in the latter. If each region had its own currency and exchange rate 
were flexible, exchange rate adjustments would provide a similar stabilizing function, as 
regions in a relative boom would experience an appreciation of their real exchange rates and a 
worsening of their current accounts, while regions in a relative recession would experience 
the opposite.
12 This consideration is the basis for Kenen’s (1969) suggestion that fiscal 
transfers among the member states of a monetary union could replace the adjustment to 
asymmetric cyclical shocks otherwise provided by the exchange rate. 
 
Empirical research in the 1990s has sought to estimate how important the transfer 
mechanisms in existing federations and large unitary states are in this regard. This discussion 
was spurred by Sachs and Sala-i-Martin’s (1991) estimates that the US federal budget 
smoothes around 33 – 40 percent of asymmetric shocks to regions in the US. Subsequent 
research has shown, however, that, for a number of data and conceptual reasons, these authors 
grossly overestimate the smoothing function of the federal budget. Estimates of this kind are 
sensitive to the use of different national accounting concepts (Mélitz and Zumer, 1999) and 
must distinguish between permanent redistribution among regions and the response to 
transitory shocks (von Hagen, 1992). The consensus estimate today is that the federal budget 
smoothes about 10-15 percent of asymmetric shocks in the US.
13  Estimates for Canada yield 
similar results.  
 
One might argue that such a mechanism is not required in the European Monetary Union (or 
elsewhere), as markets can fulfill the same function. Free trade and mobility of capital and 
labor generate opportunities for the citizens of the member states to protect themselves 
against asymmetric shocks. Indeed, empirical studies for the US suggest that financial 
markets smooth 30 to 50 percent of state-specific income shocks (Asdrubali et al, 1996; 
Athanasoulis and van Wincoop, 1998; Mélitz and Zumer, 1999). Mélitz and Zumer report 
similar results for Canada, suggesting that markets are more important in providing insurance 
than fiscal mechanisms. But, even if monetary integration promotes financial market 
integration and, thereby, the scope for protection against asymmetric shocks, one may argue 
that markets provide less insurance than citizens demand. Thus, the question remains whether 
EMU needs a fiscal insurance mechanism against asymmetric shocks. 
 
To explore the principles of fiscal insurance, consider a monetary union consisting of i=1,…,n 
states or regions. Each region is endowed in each period with a stochastic per-capita income 
yit with expected value y in all regions. Let yt be the average income in the monetary union. 
There is a fiscal transfer mechanism in the monetary union paying transfers τit to consumers 
in region i and period t. Households in each region are risk averse and have linear-quadratic 
utility functions in consumption, cit, 
                                                       
12 See Stockman (1998) for a broad review of the theoretical and empirical research on the stabilizing 
function of the real exchange rate. 
13 See von Hagen (2006) for a review of the empirical literature. 10 
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where γ>0. The households’ budget constraint is cit = yit + τit – θi, where θi is a constant tax 
imposed by the regional government, which means that individuals cannot borrow to smooth 
consumption in the presence of shocks For now, assume that θi = 0. 
  The fiscal transfer mechanism can be designed to make consumers in all regions 
better off by paying transfers that partially offset deviations from expected income. A first, 
important question is whether or not the fiscal mechanism must be balanced at all times or 
not. If budget balance is only required in expectation, the optimal policy is to set consumption 
equal to expected income each period and eliminate all variance. In this case, the optimal 
transfers are 
(7)        it it y y − = τ , 
where y is potential output. Consumers are fully insured against income shocks. This is so, 
because it eliminates any variance in consumption over time. Note that each government 
could achieve the same outcome by taxing its citizens when income is above its expected 
value and paying transfers when income is below its expected value. In this case, each 
government would borrow on behalf of its citizens in the international capital market when 
income is low and pay back when income is high.  
 
A natural question then is, why should there be a fiscal insurance at the level of the monetary 
union? The answer is two-fold. First, small countries in particular may face upward-sloping 
credit supply curves in the capital market, implying that they pay higher interest rates for 
borrowing funds when income is low than they receive on funds invested when income is 
high. Under such circumstances, pooling the individual consumption-smoothing policies will 
yield a reduction in the aggregate cost of borrowing (see Hammond and von Hagen, 1998). 
Second, if the monetary union imposes restrictions on public debts and deficits to safeguard 
the stability of the common currency, as EMU does, a common fiscal insurance mechanism 
assures that countries are not forced into suboptimal consumption patterns. By creating a 
common fiscal insurance the member countries delegate their borrowing capacity to the 
monetary union.       
 
If budget balance is required each period, the transfers are  
(8)     ∑ = + − =
i i i it t it y y . 0 , ) ( π π α τ  
They consist of a state-dependent part linked to the deviation of a region’s income from 
average income in the monetary union, and a state-independent part. Using (8) in (6), we 
obtain 
(9)   
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Forcing the system to balance at the aggregate level implies that fiscal insurance now 
smoothes fluctuations of regional income around average income in the monetary union, 
which itself is a random variable that fluctuates over time. We can use equation (9) to 
calculate the optimal, utility-maximizing transfer rate α* from the point of view of households 
in each region i, 























where ρi is the correlation between income in region i and average income in the monetary 
union, and wi indicates how volatile a region’s income is compared to average income in the 
monetary union. Equation (10) shows that, in this case, full insurance will generally not be 
optimal for all regions. Instead, different regions have different optimal transfer rates and 
each region’s optimal degree of insurance depends on its risk profile compared to the 
monetary union. Note, first, that αi
*=1 for all regions, if all individual regional incomes are 11 
 
 
uncorrelated and identically distributed.
14 Otherwise, the optimal degree of insurance depends 
on the correlation between regional and average income and on the relative volatility of 
regional and average income. If all regions have the same variance of regional income, the 
optimal degree of insurance approaches zero, as the correlation among the incomes 
approaches one. Thus, the more similar income fluctuations are over time, the scope there is 
for insurance. But note that even with positive correlations, regions with relatively large 
income variances compared to others find insurance attractive, while regions with relatively 
low income variance would prefer no insurance at all. 
 
The point of this discussion is that, if the fiscal mechanism must be balanced each period, 
regions with different risk profiles demand different degrees of insurance. Designing a 
common fiscal insurance then requires finding a compromise among the regions. This can be 
done using the state-independent transfers πi to make side payments between the regions. 
Specifically, relatively high-risk regions can pay a premium to relatively low-risk regions to 
compensate for providing more insurance than the latter would find optimal. Consider the 
following example for illustration. Let n=2 and consider a region’s expected utility given 
some transfer rate α=a. From equation (9) we have 
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where π1 = -π2. Assume that the two countries use Nash bargaining to establish the state-
independent transfers, and that each region’s fall-back position is α = 0. The equilibrium 
transfer can be found by maximizing the product [EU1(1)- EU1(0)] [EU2(1)- EU2(0)]. This 
yields the equilibrium state-independent transfer:  
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Assume, first, that the relative variances wi are the same. Then the first term is zero and 
equation (12) says that the region whose income is more highly correlated with average 
income receives a transfer from the region whose income is less correlated with average 
income. Clearly, the former has less interest in fiscal insurance against fluctuations around the 
average than the latter. The side payment is used to induce it to agree to the insurance 
mechanism. Next, assume that both correlations are negligible such that the second term 
disappears. In that case, equation (12) says that the region with the more volatile income pays 
a state-independent transfer to the region with the less volatile income.  
 
Generally, this discussion shows that a welfare-maximizing fiscal insurance mechanism will 
combine fixed transfers with state-dependent transfers, if it is required to achieve budget 
balance each period. Thus, whether or not the fiscal mechanism is allowed to borrow in times 
when average income in the monetary union is low to pay back when average income is large 
is an important aspect of the design of fiscal insurance. 
 
Consider now the possibility that regional governments can undertake policies that reduce the 
variability of regional income, and that doing so requires a fixed tax θi > 0 from all 
households. Such policies might consist of running a rainy day fund from which the 
government can in draw in times of low income, or in investing in projects improving the 
flexibility of local markets and factors of production. An important question then is, how does 
the fiscal mechanism at the level of the monetary union interfere with the regional 
governments’ optimal policy at the regional level? 
 
To answer this question, we assume that the variance of regional income and its covariance 
with average income are functions of θi. Each regional government will choose θi such that 
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It is plausible to assume that the derivatives of the two variances with respect to θi are 
negative, since reducing the variance of regional income is likely to result in a reduction in 
the variance of aggregate income. Whether or not such policies reduce the covariance, 
however, is uncertain. Using condition (13), we can derive the effect of an increase in the 
degree of fiscal insurance on the optimal policy of a regional government: 
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 Assume that policies to reduce income risk have declining marginal returns, i.e., the second 
derivatives are all positive. Equation (14) then says that the effect of fiscal insurance on the 
optimal regional policy depends crucially on the effect a region’s variance has on the variance 
of average income. If this effect is small, as it would be for small regions, regional policies 
have small effects only on the covariance of regional and average income and the variance of 
average income, and (14) is negative. Thus, an expansion of the fiscal insurance mechanism 
reduces efforts for less income variance at the regional level. The opposite may be true, 
however, for large regions, whose policies have strong effects on the monetary union’s 
average income variability.  
 
Furthermore, equation (14) shows that the response of regional policies to a small increase in 
fiscal insurance provided by the monetary union depends on the degree of insurance already 
in place. Assuming that the changes in the covariances are of smaller magnitude than the 
changes in the variances, (11) shows that an increase in fiscal insurance reduces local efforts 
to reduce income variance if α is initially close to zero. The opposite is true, however, if the 
degree of insurance is already large. In that case, regions have an incentive to engage in 
policies reducing regional income variance as this contributes to a more stable average 
income.  
 
This discussion shows that a fiscal insurance mechanism changes the incentives for regional 
governments to protect their citizens against income fluctuations, a point discussed also by 
Persson and Tabellini (1996) and Migué (1993). However, it is not clear a priori which way 
these incentive effects go. One can only conclude that a fiscal insurance mechanism may 
require additional policies at the level of the monetary union that rectify or amplify the 
incentive effects on local governments.  
  
Turning from a simple endowment economy to a macroeconomic environment raises 
additional concerns. In an economy with production, household welfare will depend not only 
on consumption but also on employment. To offset the effects of asymmetric shocks, a fiscal 
insurance mechanism should then aim at stabilizing fluctuations in employment and 
consumption. In the simple, traditional Keynesian framework with fixed prices and Keynesian 
unemployment considered by Mundell (1961) and Kenen (1969), stabilizing household 
income through fiscal insurance would still be sufficient. In a more general, dynamic macro 
economic framework, it is not.
15 An important aspect of fiscal insurance then is whether the 
                                                       
15 For recent analysis of these issues in the framework of a New-Keynesian dynamic general 
equilibrium model see Evers (2006). 13 
 
 
monetary union pays transfers to the regional governments or the households in the individual 
regions (Kletzer and von Hagen, 2001). Transfers to regional governments directly affect the 
demand for goods and services in regional markets. Transfers to households do so only 
indirectly, as they operate through the households’ budget constraint and distort their choices 
between current and future consumption one the one hand and between consumption and 
leisure on the other hand. The resulting effects on employment and savings may destabilize 
regional employment even if they reduce the impact of asymmetric shocks on regional 
consumption (Evers, 2006).  
 
As it turns out, in a more general macro framework, the optimal design of a fiscal insurance 
mechanism depends crucially on the type of shock hitting the economies. It is now well 
understood that, in the context of dynamic general equilibrium models and in the presence of 
aggregate productivity shocks, output stabilization is not an efficient policy.
16 The reason is 
that such shocks move the economy’s efficient (flexible-price) equilibrium level of output. 
They should be accommodated, since households want to adjust their levels of consumption 
and investment accordingly (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). Carrying over this insight to 
asymmetric productivity shocks implies that full insurance against such shocks is undesirable 
in a monetary union. Pure relative demand shocks of the kind considered by Mundell (1961) 
can be offset completely by transfers paid between regional governments, provided that the 
governments use these transfers to finance the purchase of goods and services in the local 
markets. In the case of productivity shocks, however, neither transfers between regional 
governments nor transfers between private households alone are sufficient to achieve optimal 
insurance. A combination of both is required to stabilize consumption and employment 
(Evers, 2006). 
 
As argued above, the scope for fiscal insurance among the participants of the European 
Monetary Union depends on the correlation of income and employment fluctuations among 
the states and regions of the union. Recent empirical work that has investigated the correlation 
of business cycles in the EMU sheds some light on this issue. Traistaru and von Hagen (2004) 
find that the correlation between country-specific and the euro-area business cycles is positive 
for all EMU member countries. Correlation coefficients vary between 0.30 and 0.50. Montoya 
and de Haan (2007) consider NUTS-1 regions in the EMU. They find that the average 
correlation between regional business cycles and the euro-area business cycle is above 0.60 
and has been growing over the past decade. This is consistent with earlier results by Artis and 
Zhang (1997) and Fatas (1997) who find that business cycles became more correlated among 
the member states of the ERM during the 1980s and 1990s. Overall, this literature suggests 
that monetary integration has lead to more strongly correlated business cycles without 
eliminating the scope for fiscal insurance altogether. Traistaru and von Hagen (2004) show 
that the business cycle correlations between the new EU member states and the euro area have 
increased but remain much weaker than the correlations among the EU-15 states. Future 
enlargements of the euro area by Central and East European countries will, therefore, increase 
the scope and desirability of a fiscal insurance mechanism.  
4.2.  Political Economy Considerations 
For a fiscal insurance mechanism in the euro area, additional considerations arise (Hammond 
and von Hagen, 1998). Since the euro area is not fully politically integrated, the political 
acceptability of a fiscal insurance mechanism is an important constraint on its design. A first 
point is that the mechanism must be fully automatic and tied to a formula determining the 
transfers. If the latter were left to the discretion of the governments, they would soon become 
politicized, e.g., by paying transfers to governments facing reelections. Since a fiscal transfer 
mechanism would create opportunities for politicians to spend monies raised from tax payers 
in other countries, it would set up a classical fiscal commons problem, allowing politicians to 
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spend money without regard to the full cost of taxation. The result would be a tendency to 
increase the volume of transfers over time. This tendency could be mitigated by requiring 
unanimity for all decision over the payment of transfers, but this would make the system too 
rigid to respond quickly to economic shocks as they arise.    
 
A second point is that such a mechanism must avoid the impression of bureaucratic discretion 
and that it serves other distributional goals than insurance. This requires transparency and, 
therefore, a relatively simple transfer formula. Furthermore, the mechanism must clearly 
address cyclical fluctuations. Hammond and von Hagen show that these two requirements 
create a trade-off. Identifying cyclical shocks properly calls for the use sophisticated 
econometric models which result in fairly complicated formulas to calculate the transfers. If, 
however, transfers are based simply on differences in real growth rates across member states, 
they generate permanent flows from fast to slow-growing countries and may even destabilize 
cyclical movements. 
 
A third point is that, if it aims at offsetting the loss of the exchange rate channel of macro 
economic adjustment, a fiscal insurance mechanism would have to target the national 
economies of the member states. The different sizes of the national economies then create an 
obvious problem if the mechanism is required to be balanced every period, i.e., stabilizing a 
negative, asymmetric shock of one percent of GDP in Luxembourg would require a transfer 
of small absolute size from the remaining countries, while stabilizing a shock of the same 
relative size in Germany would require a payment of very large absolute size from the 
remaining countries. This problem could be overcome by allowing the mechanism to run 
surpluses and deficits at the aggregate level. In that case, however, one would have to pay 
close attention to the risk that the national governments abuse it as a new source of permanent 
borrowing circumventing the strictures of the Stability and Growth Pact.   
4.3.  Assessment of Individual Proposals 
An important message from the discussion above is that the design of a fiscal transfer 
mechanism for the euro area depends critically on the question whether or not this mechanism 
would be required to be balanced financially every period. If not, the main issue that remains 
is to identify the shocks properly; once this is done, full insurance against asymmetric demand 
shocks and some partial insurance against asymmetric productivity shocks is desirable. A 
second, important message is that such an insurance mechanism should not be exposed to 
moral hazard. Proposals for fiscal insurance in the euro area should be evaluated on the basis 
of these two tenets. We consider two insurance mechanisms frequently found in existing 
federal systems. The first is the sharing of tax revenues among the government of euro-area 
member states. The second is a euro-area wide unemployment insurance. The former would 
pay transfers among the governments, while the latter would pay transfers directly to the 
households. 
3.1.1.  4.3.1. Tax Revenue Sharing 
Insurance through tax revenue sharing can be achieved by having all member governments 
pay a fixed proportion of their tax revenues annually into a common euro-area tax fund, 
which simultaneously pays out transfers to these governments on a fixed (per capita) basis. 
Payments into the fund would then vary with the evolution of the tax base over time, while 
payments out of the fund would not follow any cyclical movements. Thus, countries with 
temporarily high tax bases would pay more, countries with temporarily low tax bases would 
pay less than they receive. As governments adjust their spending accordingly, stabilization is 
provided. 
 
The appropriate tax base for such a mechanism would be VAT rather than income or payroll 
taxes. The reason is that, first, VAT is closer to demand shocks than income or payroll taxes, 
and, second, it reacts faster to cyclical movements in the economy than income taxes or 15 
 
 
payroll taxes which are often declared and paid with delays. To set up such a mechanism, 
member countries of the euro area could agree to share a portion of their VAT revenues 
through the common fund. In fact, different countries could participate in such a fund with 
different shares of their VAT revenues according to national preferences and economic 
circumstances. For example, governments with more volatile economies could decide to bring 
a larger share of their revenues into the fund. Implementation of such a mechanism would, 
therefore, not require raising VAT rates in any member state, an important condition for the 
acceptability of the proposal. 
    
An advantage of such a mechanism is that it would allow member governments to engage in 
counter-cyclical policies addressing asymmetric shocks in a way fully consistent with the 
rules of the SGP. States receiving net transfers could increase government spending without 
violating their commitment to keeping their budgets close to balance or in surplus. Note that 
the additional spending should have a greater effect on aggregate spending in the country 
concerned, as households would recognize that it is not connected with an increase in future 
tax liabilities and, hence, would not cut back private demand as in the case of deficit-financed 
government spending; a point confirmed empirically by Bayoumi and Masson (1995).  
 
Assume, first, that the mechanism does not have to achieve balance at the aggregate level. 
Effectively, it would then compensate the restrictions on borrowing at the national level by 
allowing borrowing at the level of the euro area. A strict control of the mechanism assuring 
that it does not build up a stock of permanent debt would be required; we return to this issue 
in the next section. The main moral hazard problem here is that governments would not adjust 
spending in accordance with the net transfers they pay or receive under the mechanism, and, 
thus, not provide the desired stabilization. But this problem need not worry the euro area as a 
whole. It could be left up to the national electorates to make sure that their governments use 
the resources they have available properly. 
 
Things are more complicated if the mechanism had to be balanced financially, because it 
would then have to be combined with permanent transfers among the governments 
compensating for differences in their risk profiles. Negotiating these transfers and adjusting 
them over time would require a way to reveal the true degree of risk aversion of the national 
populations and the true volatility of the asymmetric shocks. Both would be difficult to 
achieve and subject the mechanism to political games. Since governments with less volatile 
economies would receive permanent transfers under such a scheme, the mechanism would 
create incentives to implement policies at the national level that reduce the national 
economies’ exposure to asymmetric shocks. Thus, the incentive effects would work in the 
direction of reducing asymmetric shocks in this case. 
 
4.3.2. Euro-Area Unemployment Insurance  
 
The alternative proposal would be to implement a euro-area wide unemployment insurance. 
Under such a scheme, households in economies enjoying positive asymmetric shocks would 
pay rising insurance contributions which would be paid to households suffering from negative 
asymmetric shocks. This would help stabilize aggregate demand across euro-area countries. 
Since unemployment insurance would constitute an entitlement for individuals, such a 
scheme cannot be forced to balance at the aggregate level unless the governments pay 
additional contributions making good for any shortfalls of revenues over expenditures.
17  
 
An insurance mechanism of this sort would have to address a variety of problems. First, given 
that levies on labor income are large in most European countries already, it would have to be 
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implemented in a way that does not increase the cost of labor further. An obvious way to do 
that would be to replace a part of the existing unemployment insurance schemes at the 
national level to the euro-area level. Note, however, that Italy today does not have an 
unemployment insurance system at the national level. Thus, this approach would require the 
institution of a new branch of social insurance in this country. 
 
Second, many European countries have experienced an increase in non-traditional forms of 
employment in recent years, which are not included in the existing social insurance schemes. 
However, these new forms of employment are precisely those that are the most flexible ones 
in the labor market and, therefore, the most responsive ones to asymmetric shocks. The 
implementation of a euro-area wide unemployment insurance would most likely be most 
efficient, if non-traditional jobs could be integrated into the scheme. But doing so should not 
destroy their very purpose of providing flexibility to the labor market.   
 
Third, European countries suffer from very different rates of permanent unemployment. The 
main moral hazard problem of a euro-area wide insurance is that it creates incentives for 
national governments to raise (or to not do enough to lower) permanent unemployment in 
order receive permanent net transfers through the mechanism. One obvious way of dealing 
with this problem is to insist on co-insurance. Euro-area wide unemployment insurance would 
only be provided for countries that have substantial unemployment insurance at the national 
level. Given the concern over the high cost of labor in the euro area, this would limit the 
amount of insurance that can be provided at the aggregate level. An alternative solution would 
be to limit the duration of the unemployment insurance provided by a euro-area wide 
mechanism strictly to periods of six to twelve months.  
 
5.  Institutional Requirements for a Transfer System 
The analysis carried out in the previous section suggests that the most promising mutual 
insurance system rests on tax revenue sharing with a mutual fund that need not be balanced 
year after year. There are two main moral hazard problems challenging the viability of such a 
system. The first is that it might create opportunities for cheating by individual countries 
trying to induce permanent redistribution in favor of individual countries. The second is that it 
will be abused as a way to circumvent the borrowing restrictions under EMU, leading to 
permanent indebtedness of the system at the aggregate level. We now take issue with these 
challenges.  
 
5.1.  Moral Hazard Problems at the Country Level 
The purpose of the fiscal insurance system would be to insure the tax revenues of the 
participating governments against transitory asymmetric shocks. Such shocks may be 
correlated over time, but, in order to guarantee that the insurance system does not run 
permanent surpluses or deficits, only shocks that do not affect the level of taxes permanently 
can be insured. Since tax revenues in practice are affected by a mixture of permanent and 
transitory shocks, the viability of a fiscal insurance system requires a method to identify 
transitory shocks and separate them from permanent shocks. As demonstrated in Hammond 
and von Hagen (1998), this is possible, if the system can be based on sophisticated 
econometric models. This, however, is unlikely for a system that results from an agreement 
among governments of different countries. 
Ruling out complicated econometrics, a simple mechanism for calculating the transfers paid 
within the system must be found. Assuming that tax revenues of government i in period t, Tit, 
are proportional to GDP, Yit, 
(15)  it it Y T α =        
this can be achieved by tying payments into the system to the asymmetric deviation between 
actual and potential GDP, Pit, 17 
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where λ determines the degree of insurance chosen by government i, Yt and Pt, are the actual 
and the potential level of euro-area GDP, and β is the weight of country i in euro-area 
potential GDP. Countries enjoying a boom relative to the euro area would pay into the 
insurance scheme, while countries suffering from a relative recession would receive transfers. 
By definition, these deviations are transitory, assuring that the system is balanced on average 
over the business cycle. Note that, as business cycles among the participating countries 
become more correlated, transfer payments into and out of the system will become smaller. 
  A moral hazard problem arises from the fact that, in each period, a government has an 
incentive to overstate its potential GDP in order to reduce its payment into the system. To see 
this, note that (dtit/dPit) = - λα(1-β
2) < 0. In other words, faced with formula (16) as a basis for 
its payments, governments have an incentive to declare that their economy is in a recession. 
This implies that the computation of potential GDP cannot be left to the governments alone. 
One approach would be to delegate these computations to a politically independent agency, 
e.g., the European Commission or an independent research institute.  
  An alternative solution would be to modify (16) in a way that assures balance over 
time independently of the way how potential (and actual) output are calculated. Assuming 
that potential output is constant over time for simplicity, this can be done by using the 
following formula: 










t t t it it it t r P Y P Y t β λα  
The penalty term reduces any transfers received in period t by a part of the accumulated 
transfers paid in the past. Letting N be the length of the business cycle assures that this would 
not interfere with stabilizing cyclical movements. Under this approach, any misrepresentation 
of potential output in period t leads to a reduction in transfers received or an increase in 
payments made into the system in the future. By applying an appropriate interest rate r, the 
incentive to cheat is balanced by the desire to avoid future reductions in transfers received. If 
potential output is calculated properly, the penalty term converges to zero over time. It is 
straightforward to extend this approach to the case of growing potential output.   
5.2.  Moral Hazard Problems at the Aggregate Level 
At the aggregate level, the moral hazard problem lies in the possibility for the participating 
countries to abuse the insurance scheme as a way of circumventing the borrowing constraints 
under EMU. Governments running budget deficits close to three percent of GDP might ask 
for payments out of the insurance system in order increase its borrowing outside its own 
budget. Obviously, as long as a penalty as in equation (17) is applied and strictly enforced, 
these governments will be forced to run budget surpluses in future periods in order to pay 
back what they borrowed indirectly. If this is true, such indirect borrowing does not increase 
government debt permanently and does not endanger the sustainability of the common 
currency. Therefore, there is no problem for the monetary union as a whole. 
The moral hazard problem comes from the possibility that the governments agree collectively 
not to enforce the repayment embedded in the penalty. Note that, as long as each country 
strictly keeps its own account within the fiscal insurance system and is responsible for the 
liabilities created by any transfers paid to it, no government must fear becoming financially 
responsible for the misbehavior of other governments. But this may imply that governments 
would rather give into the demands of others to borrow indirectly through the insurance 
mechanism than facing an open conflict with them. The experience with the enforcement of 
the SGP in the years after 2001 suggests that this possibility cannot be ruled out.  
Ultimately, this problem is linked to the governance of the insurance mechanism. It could be 
mitigated by delegating the governance of the system to a politically independent body which 
has a vital interest in preserving its financial sustainability, either the European Commission 
of the European Central Bank. These bodies would then have the right to veto the payment of 
transfers to individual countries and to impose a penalty formula such as the one given in 18 
 
 
equation (17). For example, a veto might be triggered, if the sum of a government’s budget 
deficit and the transfer payment received from the insurance system exceeds three percent of 
GDP. Even if it is hard to imagine that such an outside body could consistently withstand 
pressures from the participating governments, delegating such veto power would have the 
advantage that such pressures are made visible to the public in the countries participating in 
the monetary union. This would strengthen the democratic accountability of the governments 
and give the voters an opportunity to penalize financially irresponsible governments. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
The Euro area will likely remain for a long time a one-of-its kind arrangement with a 
centralized monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policies. This is, after all, the same 
arrangement as in most federal states, with two key differences. First, in Europe, the “federal” 
budget is very small and largely automatic. Second, in contrast with may federations where 
decentralized budgets are subject to strict imbalance limits while the center carries out fiscal 
policy, Europe’s centralized budget must be balanced while sub-central budgets are in charge 
of fiscal policies.  
 
Concern with this arrangement has led to the SGP. We have argued that the meaningful 
concern is the risk of fiscal dominance. We have also examined the record of national fiscal 
policies before and after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and found evidence that the 
quality of fiscal policies has improved in two ways: they are more clearly countercyclical – or 
less procyclical – and they are more readily used to restore competitiveness than to attempt to 
boost demand when competitiveness is eroded.  
 
These observations suggest that fiscal policy remains a useful instrument. One question is 
whether it can be augmented – or perhaps substituted for – with a collective insurance system.  
Collective insurance is one alternative to external borrowing and lending and therefore one 
way to deal with the concerns that the SGP is meant to address. It is no panacea, though. We 
find that, to be effective and politically acceptable, a collective insurance system must be able 
not to balance every period. Put differently, effective system moves (part of) national deficits 
to the collective level.  
 
We have examined in more detail two collective insurance systems: tax revenue sharing and 
unemployment insurance sharing. We find that the earlier is more promising and examine in 
some detail how it could be set up. A nice feature of any sharing system is that it is 
structurally balanced over time. In other words, it cannot lead to debt accumulation. But is it 
fool-proof? Examining various potential loopholes, we find that, if well structured, such a 
system has desirable incentives characteristics. Individual countries that attempt to take 
advantage of the system to achieve short-term political advantage can be discouraged.  
 
There remains the possibility that collectively, Euro area governments may be tempted to use 
the insurance scheme to raise their debts. Individual governments could be tempted to 
misrepresent their true economic situation – by providing overblown estimates of their 
potential GDP – in order to obtain larger transfers. This moral hazard can be dealt with either 
by delegating the task of assessing potential GDP to an independent body, or by including in 
the net transfers a penalty, respectively a repayment, that correspond to the accumulated 
transfers received from, respectively paid into, the insurance scheme. Another risk is that 
collectively member governments agree to use the insurance mechanism to bypass the SGP. 
Here again, a solution would be to delegate to an independent body the right to block 
payments and to impose a penalty scheme. Of course, it is impossible that the independent 
body will always the gravitas to overrule a strong coalition of member governments. 
 
In the end, therefore, we face the unavoidable fact that any insurance mechanism entails 
moral hazard and that moral hazard can, at best, only be mitigated, not eliminated. If the risks 19 
 
 
are perceived as being too large, then we come back to traditional view: cyclical fluctuations 
are must be dealt with through individual borrowing and lending, augmented by the national 
use of fiscal policies. This leaves the task of imagining how to enforce fiscal discipline; the 
SGP, we argued, has probably improved the situation, but it suffers from a number of 
weaknesses. How to improve on the existing arrangement is an issue that goes beyond the 
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